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Is there a problem of induction for mathematics?
ALAN BAKER
1 Introduction
‘Induction’ is a term which means one thing in the context of mathematics and
quite another in the context of philosophy. In mathematics, induction is a famil-
iar (and highly useful) method of proof. To show that a conjecture, C (n), holds
for all natural numbers, it suffices to show that it holds for C (1)—the so-called
base step—and that if it holds for C (m) then it holds for C (m + 1)—the induc-
tion step. Mathematical induction of this sort is straightforwardly deductive. In
philosophy a distinction is standardly made between deductive and non-deductive
methods of rational support, and these latter methods (which may include in-
ference to the best explanation, abduction, analogical reasoning, etc.) are often
referred to collectively as ‘inductive reasoning’, and studied using ‘inductive lo-
gic’. Clearly mathematical induction is not ‘inductive’ in this broader philosoph-
ical sense. Induction in the narrow mathematical sense is an important—indeed
indispensable—mathematical tool, and its use is almost entirely uncontroversial.
Induction in the broad philosophical sense is a large and amorphous topic, and its
application in the domain of mathematical reasoning has been addressed in some
detail by Polya (1954).
My title question, however, uses the term ‘induction’ in a third sense. I am in-
terested specifically in the non-deductive form of reasoning known as enumerative
induction. A (hackneyed) example of this sort of reasoning is the following:
Emerald E1 is observed to be green.
Emerald E2 is observed to be green.
- - - - - - -
Emerald En is observed to be green.
Hence, all emeralds are green.
My primary aim in this paper is to sketch preliminary answers to the following
two questions:
(A) Does the mathematical community ever rely on enumerative induction to
underpin its belief in a mathematical claim?
(B) Ought enumerative inductive reasoning to ever justify our belief in a math-
ematical claim?
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